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Violent radicalization and terrorism continue to pose social and security problems.
Starting from the theoretical framework offered by the significance quest theory, the
purpose of this research was to analyze the different roles that radical intentions play
in the relationship between the loss of significance and violent disinhibition in Muslims
and non-Muslims. For this reason, we carried out two studies: the first one with 133
Muslims and 126 non-Muslims, and the second with 98 Muslims and 167 non-Muslims.
Specifically, we measured how perceived oppression influenced violent disinhibition
through radical intentions. Secondly, we also measured the impact of identity and
cultural intelligence in these relations. The main finding of the research was that there
was an indirect effect of perceived oppression on violent disinhibition through radical
intentions in the Muslim sample, whereas, in the non-Muslim sample, the effect of
perceived oppression on violent disinhibition was not mediated by radical intentions.
These results were replicated in both studies. Additionally, we found that identity
and culture were factors that moderated the proposed relations. This work therefore
shows that the conjunction of the loss of significance and radical intentions seems to
strongly exacerbate the likelihood of a process of violent disinhibition for those who
are considered to be in marginal contexts. Overall, different pathways and intervening
factors are in the process of radicalizing Muslims and non-Muslims in Western societies.
Keywords: cultural identity, cultural intelligence, perceived oppression, radicalism, violent disinhibition
INTRODUCTION
For some time now, jihadist radicalization has been receiving preferential attention from social
media, as well as though the political agenda of the European Union. Likewise, terrorism on
European soil derived from radicalism has become one of the greatest security challenges facing
Western countries. Taking this into consideration, the study of these topics is crucial to support
evidence-based decision-making. It is necessary for all academic fields, including psychology, to use
all their theoretical, empirical, and methodological resources, both basic and applied, to deal with
radicalization and terrorism. This social problem, currently aggravated by the return of foreign
terrorist fighters from Syria and Iraq after the fall of the so-called Islamic State (Barrett, 2017;
Cragin, 2017), has given rise to different theoretical perspectives and empirical investigations that
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have tried to explain the process of violent radicalization, as well
as the factors that contribute to it (Trujillo et al., 2006b; Dugas
and Kruglanski, 2014; Gómez et al., 2017; Trujillo and Moyano,
2018). Consequently, this work intends to review previous studies
and delve into the factors that underline radicalization processes
and their relationships with cultural and religious identities.
THE PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION
Radicalization can be defined as a psychosocial process that
entails an increase in the commitment to some kind of
extremist ideology (Horgan, 2009). In the last decade, different
theories and models have been developed to explain this
complex and multivariate process. Among them, the significance
quest theory (Kruglanski et al., 2009a, 2013, 2014, 2017) has
obtained outstanding empirical and experimental evidence that
has allowed it to reinforce some of its postulates and develop
proposals for preventive intervention in the community and in
risk management (Bélanger, 2017).
Basically, the significance quest refers to the people’s need
“to make a difference,” “to be important,” and “to be someone.”
According to Kruglanski et al. (2009a, 2014) there are three
events that can trigger the quest for significance: (1) the loss
of significance (e.g., humiliation, social alienation); (2) the
perception of threat to the significance (e.g., the possibility of
being rejected); and (3) the opportunity to gain considerable
significance (e.g., becoming a hero, a martyr). The significance
quest theory suggests that the (potential) loss of significance
and the opportunity to gain it stimulate collectivistic goals
to restore the loss of significance, which in turn motivates
the defense on behalf of the group (Dugas et al., 2016). This
perspective suggests that the quest for personal significance
may encourage radicalization under certain conditions. For
the radicalization process to take place, three elements are
necessary (Kruglanski et al., 2014): (1) the quest for significance
to be activated; (2) violence to be identified as a means to
achieve significance; and (3) the commitment to use violence
to achieve significance and become dominant and incompatible
with other possible sources of significance. Considering these
three elements, opting for violence as a means to achieve
significance to the detriment of more prosocial means will
depend, to a large extent, on different variables such as the
ideology of the group (Kruglanski et al., 2014) or the need
for cognitive closure (Kruglanski et al., 2009b; Webber et al.,
2018).
In a complementary way, the psychosocial model of
recruitment and violent mobilization (Trujillo et al., 2006a,b;
Trujillo and Moyano, 2018) has developed theoretically and
empirically developed how the recruitment of an individual
occurs within a violent group. According to this model,
the recruiters enlist and guide the new recruits through the
following phases: (1) identification of the individual in critical
environments (marginal scenarios); (2) uptake of the individual
in mental imbalance (first approach to the potential recruit);
(3) psychological subjection and the consequent psychological
alienation; (4) ideological indoctrination of a political and
religious nature (doctrinal alienation); (5) violent disinhibition
through the application of strategies aimed at legitimizing
violence; (6) training for the exercise of violence; and (7) logistical
support for the execution of violent actions.
Thus, in order for someone, after being indoctrinated, to
go one step further and become a violent extremist, the
individual must firmly believe in the legitimacy of violence.
For this, recruiters often use strategies based on narratives that
legitimize such violence. It is worth highlighting that, among
other possible narratives, recruiters often use ones that (1)
extol the mistreatment unjustly suffered by an indoctrinated
person; (2) look for and clearly identify those guilty of
mistreatment, who will be the victims of the violent actions;
(3) attribute the guilt of all the ills suffered to the potential
victims, who are not only clearly guilty but also deserving of
the greatest punishment; (4) dehumanize victims through the
use of adjectives that reify or animalize them; (5) displace
the responsibility to exercise violence toward a superior and
unquestionable being (i.e., God); (6) justify violence based on
superior principles (moral values, symbols, norms, roles, etc.)
that transcend the indoctrinated ones themselves; (7) disperse
the responsibility to exercise violence to everyone; and (8)
extol violence as the only instrument for the indoctrinated
to recover from the mistreatment suffered. These narratives
show revenge as the best instrument to achieve a new life
that is more dignified and shows more sense and certainty
for all.
FROM OPPRESSION TO VIOLENCE
For a premeditated and intentional action classified as violent
to be triggered, there must be a disinhibition that allows it
beforehand. Violent disinhibition refers to the desire to end
one’s own life or that of others, a high negative emotionality
(hostility, dislike, aversion, hatred, anger, and tension), and
the observational learning of violent behavior (Trujillo, 2009;
Moyano and Trujillo, 2013, 2014; Trujillo and Moyano, 2018).
Likewise, for a subject to act decisively to commit terrorist acts,
usually there is a prior event or circumstance that precipitates the
radicalization process (e.g., a grievance).
Among the triggers of the quest for significance, two stand
out: humiliation directed at the in-group and humiliation
directed at personal circumstances (Webber et al., 2018). Both
circumstances can generate a loss of significance, which could
be enough to awaken the quest (Kruglanski et al., 2013). On
the other hand, from the point of view of the psychosocial
model of recruitment, perceived or real marginality is one
of the features that could increase the risk of recruitment
(Moyano and Trujillo, 2016). Both marginality and humiliation
are variables potentially linked to the oppression construct,
another factor that has been considered a potential contributor
to the process of radicalization (Victoroff, 2005; Victoroff,
2009, Unpublished). Basically, oppression is understood as the
perception of subjugation of one group by another, imposed by
an asymmetric power and often reinforced by hostile conditions
such as threats or actual violence. However, although oppression
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is an important predecessor of violent disinhibition (Berkowitz,
1989), it does not appear to be its necessary or sufficient cause
(Victoroff, 2009, Unpublished).
Therefore, it is plausible that, in the functional relationship
between both variables, oppression and violent disinhibition,
there is another variable (or variables) that mediates this
relationship. Following the phases of the psychosocial model
of recruitment previously exposed, after identification and
recruitment, an ideological indoctrination would be necessary
(Trujillo and Moyano, 2018), that is, a totalitarian ideology that
unites the subject to the group and legitimizes the use of violence
in its defense. Such a variable would constitute a stage prior to
violent disinhibition. A construct that satisfies these conditions
are the radical intentions, defined as the intention to engage in
illegal and violent acts in defense of the in-group (Moskalenko
and McCauley, 2009). Although radicalism could be a mediator
of this relationship, two key points must be considered: the first
is that radicalism does not always lead to violence (Bartlett and
Miller, 2012); and the second is that it is foreseeable there are
cultural differences in the process of radicalization.
THE ROLE OF IDENTITY AND CULTURE
The evidence has also shown that identity and cultural
factors could play an important role in the process of
radicalization. Thus, Lyons-Padilla et al. (2015) found that the
more discrimination experienced by Muslim Americans, the
less purpose and meaning they had, especially in the case of
those perceived without a cultural referent. In other words,
marginalization did not predict support for more fundamentalist
groups directly but through the loss of significance. In summary,
for immigrants or minority groups who feel they are marginalized
and experience higher rates of need for closure, the loss of
significance seems to have a strong relation with support for
extreme groups or measures. Therefore, it is predictable that in
European societies, especially in certain contexts associated with
the risk of social exclusion and marginalization (Shavit, 2014), the
effect will be stronger for Muslims than for non-Muslims when
they suffer a loss of significance.
Other research has analyzed the cultural dependence on the
need for cognitive closure. Webber et al. (2018) found in different
cultural samples that avoidance of uncertainty, or the need for
cognitive closure, alongside the lack or the loss of significance,
can lead to adherence to extremist organizations that justify
violence. This point is related to the studies of Kosic et al. (2004),
who found a relationship between the higher need for closure
and bad acculturation. As we can see, the relationships between
identity, culture, and radicalization are complex and influenced
by different variables.
In that sense, using data from the Pew Research Center surveys
on Muslim residents in European and American territories,
Victoroff et al. (2012) found that perceived discrimination
toward Muslims was associated with the legitimization of suicide
terrorism, being a risk factor for political violence. Furthermore,
in a field investigation developed in a vulnerable urban
environment, Moyano and Trujillo (2014) found a significant
relationship between perceived oppression, radical intentions,
and violent disinhibition in a Muslim sample, whereas the same
relations were not significant in a sample of Christians. They
concluded that these results are due to a greater cohesion with
religion on the part of the Muslim sample and the context’s
demographic characteristics, which include the perception of an
out-group threat residing in a marginal neighborhood. Thus,
religious or cultural identity seems to be an important factor
that strengthens the relationship between the perception of
oppression, radical intentions, and violent disinhibition.
Finally, we highlight the role of cultural intelligence (Earley
and Ang, 2003; Ang and Van Dyne, 2008). This construct
represents the capacity to effectively adapt to contexts with
a strong cultural component, and it could be considered a
protective factor against radicalization and violent extremism
(Fang et al., 2018; Trujillo and Moyano, 2018). Although it is
a territory that still needs to be explored, Moyano et al. (2015)
found that cultural intelligence showed a negative relationship
with constructs such as the meaning of life and the need for
cognitive closure, which, in turn, have been proposed as factors
influencing violent extremism (Klein and Kruglanski, 2013;
Kruglanski et al., 2015; Trujillo et al., 2016). This leads to the
assumption that cultural intelligence could also be acting as a
moderator in the process of radicalization so that people with
lower levels of cultural intelligence would be more willing to use
violence.
All the exposed factors represent only some of those that have
been associated with the radicalization process. In this work, we
try to provide empirical evidence with an exploratory intention
that helps to deepen the knowledge of the interrelations between
potentially relevant factors and using interesting samples from an
ecological point of view. That is, the proposed relations establish
that the loss of significance will trigger violent disinhibition.
These relations could be enhanced by a violent narrative that
supports pro-group radical actions. Given the cultural and
identity differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in the
context of Western societies, we propose that the radicalization
processes will be different for both groups.
THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION
Based on the reviewed empirical evidence, it is expected that
the perceived oppression will facilitate violent disinhibition, in
both Muslim and non-Muslim residents in Spain, and that this
relationship will be mediated by the radical intentions in a
different way in both groups due to the identity and cultural
differences. To verify these assumptions, two studies that seek to
answer the following hypotheses have been proposed:
(1) In Muslims, the radical intentions will have a mediating
effect on the relationship between perceived oppression,
considered a predictor variable, and violent disinhibition,
considered a criterion, and there will be no such mediating effect
in non-Muslims.
(2) Social identity and cultural intelligence will moderate the
indirect effect of mediation previously proposed, in the sense
that those with a stronger cultural identity and lower cultural
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intelligence will be more prone to violent disinhibition. Due to
the lack of more concrete evidence, this hypothesis is considered
exploratory because it cannot be confirmed what moderating
relationships will occur or if differences will arise between
Muslims and non-Muslims.
STUDY 1
In the first study, it was evaluated whether the radical intentions
are mediating the relationship between perceived oppression,
considered a predictor variable, and disinhibition to violence,
considered a criterion variable. To this end, a sample of Muslims
and a sample of non-Muslims who lived in areas considered at
risk for radicalization were established.
The samples were collected from two marginal neighborhoods
in Spain where Muslims and non-Muslims coexist in similar
proportions (Trujillo et al., 2011; Moyano and Trujillo, 2013,
2014; De la Corte, 2015). One of them is the Autonomous
City of Melilla, and the other is the neighborhood of El Puche,
located in the city of Almería. In both contexts, interventions by
the security forces and critical incidents associated with jihadist




The sample consisted of 259 young people (133 Muslims and 126
non-Muslims), all of them students in two secondary education
institutes. Of the 259 students, 119 attended an institute in the
neighborhood of Puche in the city of Almería (city in southeast
Spain), and 140 attended an institute in the Autonomous City
of Melilla (Spanish city in North Africa). The students of both
institutes belonged to a social context with a high risk of social
exclusion. With regard to gender, the group of Muslims was
composed of 64 men, 66 women, and three unidentified; and
that of non-Muslims had 56 men and 70 women. The age of
the participants was between 13 and 18 years old (M = 15.89,
SD = 1.05). Regarding the sample, despite our attempts to get
a large sample, access to people in these social contexts limited
the sample size. On the other hand, according to Fritz and
MacKinnon (2007), a sample of 90 participants are required to
get an indirect effect of 0.16 given that both paths are estimated to
be medium size (0.39) if the Sobel test is performed. Thus, given
the circumstances, we believe we have adequate power.
Evaluation Instruments
Two types of questionnaires with the same measures were
prepared, both in Spanish, but with a variation in the wording
for some of them depending on whether they were intended for
Muslims or non-Muslims. Muslims evaluated the oppression by
non-Muslims and the intentions to defend their own group, while
non-Muslims did the same with respect to the group of Muslims.
Religious group
The participants responded to an item identifying their religious
group (Muslim religion vs. Christian religion).
Perceived oppression
A Spanish adaptation of the Oppression Questionnaire, an
instrument that consists of 32 items that assess perceived
oppression (α = 0.95; Victoroff et al., 2006; Moyano, 2011), was
applied. The items were scored on a Likert-type scale from 1
(totally disagree) to 4 (totally agree), for example, “My group is
often treated unfairly.” In this, the perceived oppression between
Muslims and non-Muslims was assessed.
Radical intentions
The participants completed the Moskalenko and McCauley
(2009) adapted to Spanish by Trujillo et al. (2016; α = 0.90). The
scale comprises four items (e.g., “I would continue to support an
organization that fights for the political and legal rights of my
group even if it sometimes goes beyond the law,” “I would attack
the police or the security forces if I saw them hit members of
my group”). The evaluation of the items was done by means of a
Likert-type scale with scores of 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally
agree”). Higher scores indicate greater radical intentions.
Violent disinhibition
The Disinhibition to Violence subscale (α = 0.82), which forms
part of a broader instrument, the Questionnaire on Risk of
Islamist Radicalization in Young People (Moyano, 2011), whose
objective is to evaluate multiple factors potentially contributing
to radicalization, was applied. This subscale is made up of four
items that assess violence intentions to the self (“In the last month
I have had the desire to end my own life”) or to others (“In
the last month I have had wishes to end the lives of others”),
hatred toward others (“In the last month I have felt hatred for
some people”), and exposure to models that favor violence (“My
friends continually talk about fights and violent issues”). The
items were scored on a Likert-type scale with scores between 1
(“totally disagree”) and 5 (“totally agree”).
Sociodemographic variables
Information on sociodemographic variables such as age and
gender was also recorded.
Procedure
The participants collaborated on a voluntary basis once the
study was approved by the School Council, and a written
informed consent was obtained from the participants’ parents.
The evaluation took place in the classrooms of the respective
centers for approximately 50 min. The centers’ staff collaborated
with the application of the evaluation instruments.
Results
Muslims
In order to determine whether the radical intentions exert
a mediating effect on the relationship between perceived
oppression and violent disinhibition in the sample of Muslims
(N = 113), following the recommendations of Baron and
Kenny (1986), and Kenny (2014), different regression analyses
were performed (Figure 1). The results indicated a statistically
significant predictive capacity of perceived oppression on the
radical intentions (β = 0.625, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.374), of
the radical intentions on violent disinhibition (β = 0.618,
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FIGURE 1 | Mediation of oppression on violent disinhibition through the
radical intentions in the Muslim sample of Study 1. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01;
∗∗∗p < 0.001, typified scores.
p < 0.001, R2 = 0.373), and of the perceived oppression on
violent disinhibition (β = 0.576, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.314). After
carrying out the three simple regressions described above, a
multiple linear regression was performed, taking the perceived
oppression and the radical intentions together as predictors
and the violent disinhibition as a criterion. The results of the
analysis indicated that when the radical intentions predictor
is introduced into this multiple regression model, perceived
oppression loses its predictive capacity on violent disinhibition
(β = 0.325, p = 0.051), whereas the radical intentions continues
to show predictive capacity on violent disinhibition (β = 0.402,
p = 0.017). Following the suggestions of Beckstead (2009) and
Kenny (2014), the Sobel (1982) test was subsequently performed,
and the results showed a significant mediating effect of the radical
intentions (z = 3.872, p < 0.001). Given the possible controversy
in the causal relationship between radical intentions and violent
disinhibition, the same analysis was realized when changing the
mediator variable for the dependent variable; that is, violent
disinhibition became the mediator and radical intentions the
dependent variable. The Sobel test did not show a significant
mediating effect for violent disinhibition (z = 0.796, p = 0.213).
Non-Muslims
In the non-Muslim group (N = 126), the same analyses as those
indicated above for the group of Muslims were carried out
(Figure 2). The results indicated that the perceived oppression
did not significantly predict the radical intentions (β = 0.136,
FIGURE 2 | Mediation of oppression on violent disinhibition through the
radical intentions in the non-Muslim sample of Study 1. ∗p < 0.05;
∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001, typified scores.
p = 0.410, R2 = 0.008) and the same is true for the radical
intentions on violent disinhibition (β = 0.020, p = 0.950,
R2 = 0.023). However, predictive capacity was found for perceived
oppression on violent disinhibition (β = 0.344, p = 0.037,
R2 = 0.093). Once these three simple regressions were carried out,
a multiple linear regression was performed, taking the perceived
oppression and the radical intentions together as predictors
and the violent disinhibition as a criterion. The results of the
analysis indicated that when the radical intentions predictor
is introduced in the multiple regression model mentioned
above, the perceived oppression maintains its predictive capacity
on violent disinhibition (β = 0.353, p = 0.036), whereas the
radical intentions still shows no predictive capacity on violent
disinhibition (β = −0.073, p = 0.654). Furthermore, similar to the
sample of Muslims, when radical intentions was the dependent
variable, the mediation effect of violent disinhibition was not
significant (z = 684, p = 0.304).
Discussion
In summary, it can be said that the proposed hypothesis was
confirmed. In the case of Muslims, the perceived oppression is
not a direct predictor of violent disinhibition because the radical
intentions have a mediating effect in this functional relationship.
Thus, for perceived oppression to generate violent disinhibition
in young people of the Muslim religion, it is necessary that
they show an attitude toward radicalism. On the other hand,
perceived oppression is a direct predictor of violent disinhibition
among non-Muslims, since, in this functional relationship,
radical intentions do not exert a mediating effect; consequently,
for perceived oppression to generate violent disinhibition in
young people of the non-Muslim religion, it is not necessary for
them to show an intention toward radicalism.
STUDY 2
Given the results of Study 1, a second study was conducted to
replicate and possibly ratify the results of the first one (Hypothesis
1) and, in addition, to verify if other factors such as cultural
identity and cultural intelligence acted as moderating variables
of the proposed mediations (Hypothesis 2). For this, moderated
mediations were carried out, and, once again, a sample composed
of both Muslims and non-Muslims was established.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The sample consisted of 265 participants (98 Muslims and
167 non-Muslims) living in the Spanish city of Granada. The
sample was collected at the bus station and in areas adjacent
to the mosques and neighborhoods where there is a greater
proportion of Muslims. The participants were randomly selected;
they were approached in the street, and after understanding and
accepting the application of the questionnaire, they were given
the necessary time to complete it. The number of participants
was intentionally kept balanced in terms of gender. Of these,
174 were Spanish by birth, 16 were children of immigrants with
Spanish nationality (second generation immigrants), 19 had dual
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citizenship, 45 were foreigners residing in Spain, and 11 did not
report nationality. Regarding gender, the group of Muslims was
composed of 40 men and 58 women, and that of non-Muslims
was 70 men and 97 women. The age of the participants was
between 18 and 75 (M = 28.04, SD = 10.60).
Among Muslims, 89.9% declared themselves to be
practitioners compared to 10.1% who declared themselves to
be non-practicing. In the non-Muslim group, 56.3% considered
themselves Christians and 43.7% declared not to have any
religion. Of those who considered themselves Christians, 28.1%
indicated that they were practitioners, while 71.9% considered
themselves non-practicing.
Among Muslims, 17% of the participants never attended a
mosque, 37.5% did so on special occasions, 9.1% once a month,
3.4% once every fortnight, 18.2% once a week, 5.7% 3 or 4 days
a week, 5.7% every day, and 3.4% several times a day. Regarding
the frequency of prayer, 4.5% of the participants never prayed,
3.4% almost never, 3.4% occasionally, 5.6% several times a year,
7.9% often, 1.1% very often, and 74.1% every day. The exclusivity
of God, that is, if their God was the only true God, was also
inquired, with an 11-point Likert-type scale (0 = not at all agree
to 10 = totally agree). The mean was 8.40 (SD = 3.22).
In the sample of non-Muslims, 40.7% of participants never
attended church, 49.1% did so on special occasions, 4.8% once
a month, 0.6% once every fortnight, 4.2% once a week, and 0.6%
3 or 4 days a week. Regarding the frequency of prayer, 46.7% of
participants never prayed, 19.3% almost never, 9% occasionally,
7.3% several times a year, 11.5% often, 1.9% very often, and 4.3%
every day. The exclusivity of God was also inquired, with an 11-
point Likert-type scale (0 = not at all agree to 10 = totally agree).
The mean was 1.33 (SD = 2.56).
Evaluation Instruments
All the participants completed one of the four versions of the
questionnaire dealing with the counterbalance of the measures
and their religious group (Muslims vs. non-Muslims). No
significant differences were found between the two versions
regarding the order. Taking into account the variations among
Muslims and non-Muslims, the same variations in wording were
found in Study 1; that is, Muslims evaluated the oppression by
non-Muslims and the intentions to defend their own group,
and non-Muslims evaluated the oppression by Muslims and
the intentions to defend the in-group. In all of the proposed
measures, except for those in which another scale was specified, a
5-point Likert-type response scale was used (completely disagree
to completely agree).
Group identification
A measure composed of two group identification indicators
(Western-Christian and Arab-Muslim culture) was used,
applying a 7-point Likert-type scale. Higher scores indicate
greater group identification.
Perceived oppression
A reduced version of the scale used in Study 1 (R-OQ
questionnaire; Lobato, 2017, Unpublished) was used to measure
the perceived oppression. In this case, oppression was measured
by the cultural out-group (Western-Christian vs. Arab-Muslim)
(α = 0.93).
Radical intentions
The same scale as in Study 1 was used (α = 0.81).
Violent disinhibition
The Disinhibition to Violence subscale used in Study 1 was
applied (α = 0.65).
Cultural intelligence
Ang et al. (2007) scale adapted to Spanish by Moyano et al.
(2015) was used. The scale consists of 20 items that evaluate
four factors: (1) the meta-cognitive component (“I am aware of
cultural differences and adapt to them in interactions with people
from other cultures”; α = 0.72); (2) the cognitive component (“I
know the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures”;
α = 0.87); (3) the motivational component (“I enjoy living in other
cultures not familiar to me”; α = 0.83); and (4) the behavioral
component (“I alter my facial expression when the cultural
interaction situation requires it”; α = 0.84). Higher scores indicate
greater cultural intelligence.
Sociodemographic variables
Information on sociodemographic variables such as religion, age,
and gender was also recorded.
Procedure
The participants completed the survey without receiving any
compensation. Once they were presented with the survey, they
first accepted its terms and then proceeded to respond to different
measures included in the study. The participants were offered




As in Study 1, a mediation analysis was carried out to determine
whether the radical intentions in the sample of Muslims
showed a mediating effect on the relationship between perceived
oppression and violent disinhibition (Figure 3). The results
indicated the statistically significant predictive capacity of the
perceived oppression on the radical intentions (β = 0.288,
FIGURE 3 | Mediation of oppression on violent disinhibition through the
radical intentions in the Muslim sample of Study 2. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01;
∗∗∗p < 0.001, typified scores.
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p = 0.004, R2 = 0.073), of the radical intention on violent
disinhibition (β = 0.401, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.152), and of
the perceived oppression on violent disinhibition (β = 0.269,
p = 0.009, R2 = 0.062). Subsequently, a multiple linear regression
was performed taking the perceived oppression and the radical
intentions together as predictors, and the violent disinhibition as
a criterion. The results indicated that when the radical intentions
are introduced in this model, the perceived oppression loses its
predictive capacity on violent disinhibition (β = 0.170, p = 0.089),
whereas the radical intentions continue to show predictive
capacity on the violent disinhibition (β = 0.354, p = 0.001). The
Sobel (1982) test showed that there was a significant mediating
effect of the radical intentions (z = 2.261, p = 0.024). The results
obtained in the first study were corroborated once again; the
radical intentions act as a mediator between perceived oppression
and violent disinhibition in a sample of Muslims. Similar to
Study 1, we replicated the analysis by changing the mediator
variable for the dependent variable. The Sobel test showed
a significant mediating effect of violent disinhibition on the
predictive capacity of perceived oppression on radical intentions
(z = 2.140, p = 0.032). In this case, it was a “feedback effect”
(Kenny, 2014), which was not found in the first study.
In a second step, analyses of moderate mediations were carried
out by means of the macro PROCESS for SPSS (Hayes, 2013),
with the objective to check whether the mediation of the radical
intentions in the relationship between perceived oppression and
violent disinhibition occurred independently of the components
of cultural intelligence and cultural identity. To this end, the
different components of cultural intelligence and cultural identity
were used as moderators of the indirect effect (Models 7, 14,
and 58 of Hayes were tested, in which moderation is found in
both paths of the indirect effect). The only significant model
appeared when the motivational component was a moderator
in the relationship between the radical intentions and violent
disinhibition (Model 14 of PROCESS, Figure 4). The results
showed that the direct effect was not significant (b = 0.041,
SE = 0.08, p = 0.489, 95% CI [−0.125; 0.207]), whereas the
conditional indirect effect (b = −0.071; 95% CI [−0.151; −0.001])
occurred in those who had low (b = 0.097; 95% CI [0.002;
0.223]) and medium (b = 0.048; 95% CI [0.002; 0.148]) scores in
motivational cultural intelligence, but not in those who scored
high (b = −0.001; 95% CI [−0.038; 0.061]).
Non-Muslims
The same analyses were repeated with the sample of non-
Muslims. In the first instance, the mediation of the radical
intentions was analyzed (Figure 5). The results indicated that
the perceived oppression had a predictive capacity on the radical
intentions (β = 0.233; p = 0.003; R2 = 0.049) but not the
radical intentions on violent disinhibition (β = 0.140; p = 0.071;
R2 = 0.014). On the other hand, perceived oppression also
had a predictive capacity on violent disinhibition (β = 0.281;
p < 0.001; R2 = 0.073). Once these three simple regressions were
carried out, a multiple linear regression was performed taking
the perceived oppression and the radical intentions together as
predictors and the violent disinhibition as a criterion. The results
of this analysis indicated that when the radical intentions as
a predictor are introduced into the multiple regression model,
the perceived oppression maintains its predictive capacity on
violent disinhibition (β = 0.264, p = 0.001), whereas the radical
intentions continue without showing predictive capacity on
violent disinhibition (β = 0.071, p = 0.366). Again, we examined
the mediating effect after changing the mediator variable for the
dependent variable. The Sobel test did not show a significant
mediating effect from violent disinhibition (z = 0.878, p = 0.380).
After determining that mediation did not occur, unlike with
the sample of Muslims, the same analyses of moderate mediations
were carried out with the sample of Muslims to estimate whether
the introduction of the components of cultural intelligence or
cultural identity as moderators would produce the indirect effect.
It was found that identification with the Western-Christian
culture was a significant moderator of the indirect effect, but
not the cultural intelligence. That is, Western-Christian cultural
identity moderated the relationship between oppression and the
radical intentions while moderating the relationship between the
radical intentions and violent disinhibition (Model 58, Figure 6).
The results showed that the direct effect was significant (b = 0.180,
SE = 0.05, p < 0.001, 95% CI [0.074; 0.287]) whereas the
conditional indirect effect occurred for those with high scores
(b = 0. 067; 95% CI [0.009; 0.154]) but not for those with medium
(b = 0.006; 95% CI [−0.012; 0.044]) or low (b = −0.007; 95% CI
[−0.045; 0.023]) scores.
Discussion
The hypothesis proposed in the first study was confirmed
in this study. Although there was mediation by the radical
intentions in the relationship between oppression and violent
disinhibition in the Muslim sample, in the non-Muslim sample,
no such mediation was found, although it was found that
oppression was a significant predictor of the radical intentions.
On the other hand, several moderators of the proposed
mediations were found in both samples. In the case of
Muslims, the motivational component of cultural intelligence
moderated the relationship between the radical intentions and
violent disinhibition. Specifically, mediation only occurred when
participants had low or medium cultural motivation. Conversely,
in the non-Muslim sample, it was only when the participants
showed high identification with the Western-Christian culture
that the mediation of the radical intentions in the relationship
between oppression and violent disinhibition took place.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Violent radicalization is an issue causing great concern in
Western countries. The return of radicalized people who have
fought in countries of the Middle East is a new problem that
Western societies must face (Barrett, 2017; Reinares and García-
Calvo, 2017; Europol, 2018). Specifically, the possibility that these
returnees act like recruiters increases the risk of radicalization.
To make matters worse, several factors have been proposed
in favor of violent radicalization; among them are relative
deprivation, the need for cognitive closure, social exclusion,
or perceived oppression (Trujillo et al., 2006a,b). Our studies
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FIGURE 4 | Moderated mediation of oppression on violent disinhibition through the radical intentions with motivational cultural intelligence as a moderator in the
Muslim sample of Study 2. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001, not typified scores.
FIGURE 5 | Mediation of oppression on violent disinhibition through the
radical intentions in the non-Muslim sample of Study 2. ∗p < 0.05;
∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001, typified scores.
focus on determining whether the quest for significance can
encourage people to use violence once they have been subjected
to a violent narrative. It was also considered that the influence
of these factors would be different depending on whether the
groups were Muslims or non-Muslims. Consequently, the studies
propose to evaluate in Muslims and non-Muslims if the perceived
oppression was a predictor of the violent disinhibition that
acted through the radical intentions. Both studies confirmed this
hypothesis in each of the Muslim samples. In contrast, in the
non-Muslim sample, oppression turned out to be a predictor
of violent disinhibition, but the indirect effect of the radical
intentions was not found. Another point of discussion is the
feedback effect that appeared in the Muslim sample in the second
study. The significant prediction of changing the position of the
mediator variable and dependent variable suggests that the two
influence each other. Therefore, we should be cautious with the
interpretations when this effect was not replicated. Additional
studies, including the manipulation of the mediator variable, are
needed to establish a conclusion.
In addition, it was believed that the influence of the
perceived oppression on violent disinhibition through the
radical intentions would depend on other variables, more
precisely cultural-religious identity and cultural intelligence. It
was found that cultural intelligence, specifically the motivational
component, moderated the relationship between the radical
FIGURE 6 | Moderated mediation of oppression on violent disinhibition
through the radical intentions with cultural identity as a moderator in the
non-Muslim sample of Study 2. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001, not
typified scores.
intentions and violent disinhibition in the sample of Muslims.
That is, the indirect effect of the radical intentions on violent
disinhibition occurred only in those Muslims with a lower
level of motivational cultural intelligence. Specifically, because
motivational cultural intelligence is defined as an intrinsic
interest in experiencing other cultures and interacting with
different people (Ang and Van Dyne, 2008), those with less
interest are more prone to show a violent disinhibition. On
the other hand, in the sample of non-Muslims, it was found
that a high identification with the Western-Christian culture
allowed the indirect effect of radical intentions on the relationship
between perceived oppression and violent disinhibition.
According to the significance quest theory (Kruglanski et al.,
2009a, 2013, 2014, 2017), the results obtained are consistent
with previous studies, where it has been determined that the
loss of significance (the perceived oppression in this case) can
predict violent disinhibition or extremism (Webber et al., 2018).
In addition, the radical intentions, understood as the willingness
to carry out illegal and violent activities (Moskalenko and
McCauley, 2009), act as a mediator of this relationship. Therefore,
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these studies add another variable that would act as a mediator
in the significance quest theory. On the other hand, from
the perspective of the psychosocial model of recruitment, the
intention of radicalization contributes to a greater vulnerability
for Muslims. In other words, during the phases of disinhibition
and violent legitimation, the new radical will end up considering
violent actions as lawful and instrumentally valid to achieve his
objectives, which will conform to those imposed by his group.
Sometimes, given the right conditions, people who are well
indoctrinated and radicalized in violence may end up firmly
believing that death for killing is necessary to give the maximum
possible meaning to his existence and to be able to enjoy a pure
life beyond the mundane. In this way, violent disinhibition will
allow the individual to perceive violent actions as lawful and
instrumentally valid in achieving the group’s objective (Trujillo
and Moyano, 2018). In addition, when violent narrative induces
the violent disinhibition, interpreting this as a possible mental
illness loses its validity. This option seems more plausible when
violent disinhibition is triggered by the perception of oppression.
However, these arguments are only speculations.
Regarding the moderating variables, cultural identity and
cultural intelligence, both factors of vulnerability (or protection,
depending on their degree) within the psychosocial model
of recruitment, it can be said that they complement the
contributions of the significance quest theory. In the case of
Muslims, cultural intelligence seems to be a factor associated
with a better integration and understanding of the Western-
Christian culture, but it is not relevant for non-Muslims in this
context. Consequently, it can be argued that this result could
be related to a lack of integration; those who are less interested
in mainstream culture are more likely to use violence. Likewise,
cultural identity is of greater importance for non-Muslims,
probably because Muslims have a stronger identification with
their culture and religion, which can create a glass ceiling
effect. In future studies, it is essential to verify the relationship
that these variables could have with the need for cognitive
closure, which has been seen as a mediator of the relationship
between the loss of significance and extremism (Webber et al.,
2018).
Taking into account the results as a whole, although more
empirical evidence is needed, the effects found are consistent
with the reviewed theoretical models and previous research.
However, it is necessary to highlight some of the limitations of
this study. The first limitation lies in the structure of the studies.
The questionnaire designs used do not allow us to determine
the direction of the found effects; therefore, experimental
studies that could validate the effects of the proposed factors
contributing to the radicalization, as well as the moderating
effect of the cultural identity and cultural intelligence, would
be necessary (although experimental studies on this subject
will also carry their own set of pitfalls). Another limitation
is the difficulty in interpreting why the other components
of cultural intelligence did not have the same effects as the
motivational component, for which it would be necessary to
carry out more studies and with different types of samples.
Finally, we highlight that people of different contexts were
grouped by their religious identification (Study 1) or religious-
cultural identification (Study 2). This could be considered a
limitation given that other characteristics or identities could be
more important. On the other hand, in making them choose a
religion, their religious identity was activated; this may explain
the reason for the replication. We recommend that future studies
analyze the possible cultural differences that could influence the
radicalization processes.
In summary, these studies offer a contribution to an
underexplored field: the moderating effect of cultural intelligence
and its respective subdimensions on violent disinhibition. They
also provide more empirical data on the importance of group
identity, perceived oppression, and radical intentions, which
could add new pieces to the puzzle that radicalization presents.
This research provides new evidence and an explanation to the
different pathways to radicalization of Muslims and non-Muslims
in the context of Western societies. The loss of significance
seems to be a trigger for violent radicalization that has a higher
impact on Muslims, and this could be potentially explained by
the socioeconomic marginalization they face or perceive. The
conjunction of the loss of significance and radical intentions
seems to exacerbate the likelihood of a process of violent
disinhibition, which, in turn, increases the vulnerability vis-à-
vis potential recruiters and the risk of engaging in terrorist
activity.
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